


Graph

Year	Claimants Paid Benefits	Initial Claims	Continued Claims	Covered Employment	Insured Unemployment Rate	Claimants Paid/Initial Claims	2% of initial claims	Fed. Programs
2007	332,982	638,548	3,859,801	2,732,290	2.72	52.15%	12,771	
2008	386,574	736,245	4,499,063	2,746,602	3.15	52.51%	14,725 EUC and EUC (1-2)	
2009	566,353	1,125,127	8,242,393	2,739,145	5.78	50.34%	22,503 EUC (1-2 and 1-4)	
2010	530,886	826,872	6,401,017	2,634,645	4.66	64.20%	16,537 EUC (1-4)	
2011	445,538	722,018	5,203,327	2,596,826	3.78	61.71%	14,440 EUC (1-4)	
2012	366,829	613,667	4,518,831	2,642,306	3.29	59.78%	12,273 EUC (1-4 and 1-4 revised)	
2013	312,325	550,050	4,003,216	2,664,048	2.89	56.78%	11,001 EUC (1-4 revised)	
2014	233,129	488,472	3,295,590	2,693,988	2.35	47.73%	9,769	
2015	197,070	423,858	2,637,618	2,722,302	1.87	46.49%	8,477	
2016	168,006	385,405	2,197,136	2,759,140	1.50	43.59%	7,708	
2017	144,727	305,813	1,835,594	2,793,316	1.27	47.33%	6,116	
2018	130,710	279,912	1,638,915	2,817,338	1.12	46.70%	5,598	
2019	129,888	287,043	1,592,892	2,841,153	1.08	45.25%	5,741	
2020	603,459	1,202,700	7,713,079	2,854,373	5.20	50.18%	24,054 PUA, PEUC, PUC, LWA	
2021	295,249	529,476	3,318,291	2,722,224	2.33	55.76%	10,590 PUA, PEUC, PUC, MEUC	
2022	116,302	263,248	1,308,406	2,754,514	0.90	44.18%	5,265	

Source: <https://oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/claims.asp> and DWD Financial Reports for claimants paid data (IRS 1099)

Note: all 2020 and on initial claims and continued claims data does NOT include PUA claims, but Claimants Paid Benefits does include those paid PUA and PEUC



Claim filing after the pandemic

vforberger :: 11/13/2022




In late 2022, it is time to see what has happened in Wisconsin with unemployment claim-filing.

Note: The charts presented here are from the [Unemployment Insurance Data Explorer](#), which takes DOL unemployment data obtained from the states and provides a quick way to see what this data means.

Why claims are denied

First, some basic facts need to be introduced. Far too many people think that unemployment claims are approved or denied because of a dispute over a job separation between employee and employer.

That has not been the case since the Great Recession, however. Since before 2014, most initial determinations have denied a claim for reasons that have nothing to do with a job separation reason.



The green line on this chart shows the proportion of initial determination denials that are based on a job separation reason. From 2013 to 2015, roughly 20% of denial reasons were because of a dispute over the job separation. By 2016, that percentage was down to just over 10% and stayed there until the pandemic. Then the percentage climbed steadily to around 30% of all denials. This increase was because the

Department examined all lay-offs arising from the pandemic for a prior disqualifying separation within a claimant's benefit year to find a reason for denying that pandemic-related layoff claim. Yes, **even though experience-rating charges were supposed to be waived during the pandemic**, the Department still looked for disqualifying reasons from a prior job loss in which to deny eligibility.

So, with the pandemic now over, denials based on separations have declined markedly. With the hot job market, separation reasons are now below 10%.


So, the real story of why claims are denied has nothing to do with a dispute between employer and employee over the job separation. The red line showing non-separation reasons is where most denials now happen. In 2013, over 40% of the initial determinations denying a claim were for reasons that had nothing to do with a job separation, and this percentage began climbing steadily due to **new job search requirements**, the move to on-line only claims-filing for **initial claims** and **weekly certifications**, and **confusing and legalistic guidance about claim-filing**. By 2016 to 2017, that percentage had climbed to 60%, but fell back down to just over 50% by 2018 (with no change in the law, election year anyone?). In 2019, still without any changes in law, the percentage began climbing again and was back at around 60% when the pandemic started. Yikes.

With the pandemic, this percentage declined back down to 2013 levels of just over 40%. In 2021 and 2022, however, there has been a rapid rise in these non-separation denial reasons, and Wisconsin is back at around 60% of all initial determination denying eligibility for non-separation reasons.

So, for many years now, the hurdle for eligibility has had little to do with job separation reasons and much to do with satisfying Department claim-filing requirements.

The true significance of the role of non-separation reasons can be seen in what happens per initial claim.

Note: An initial claim is what a claimant files to report a job loss for which he or she wants to claim unemployment benefits. No benefits are paid, however, based on an initial claim. Claimants must then file weekly certifications (called continuing claims in other states) for each week they want to be paid unemployment benefits. Because initial claims start an unemployment claim, they measure job losses and the claimants affected by those job losses. Weekly certifications, on other hand, only measure the number of people still successfully filing unemployment claims or who are still seeking to file such claims.




Outside of a slight dip in the pandemic and a recent increase in 2022, the green line for separation reasons hardly changed at all. The red line for non-separation reasons, however, began to nearly double in 2015 from 25% to almost 50%. By 2018, this denial rate for initial claims had declined slightly to just over 40%. And, there was a steep decline that began in 2019 just before the pandemic struck, and that steep decline continued into the pandemic, such that in 2020 the denial rate was almost the same as the denial rate for job separations. Since then, however, the denial rate for non-separation reasons for initial claims has skyrocketed and is nearing 80% by the end of 2022. Together with the separation denial rate for initial claims climbing slightly to 15% at the end of 2022 (a seasonal climb every fall because, you know, winter), nearly 95% of initial claims were being denied at the end of 2022. Wow!

Just what are non-separation reasons

So, separation reasons (misconduct, substantial fault, or quitting a job without good cause) are not why the Department is finding the vast majority of claimants not eligible for unemployment benefits. The real reason the Department is finding claimants not eligible for unemployment benefits has to do with non-separation reasons.

Non-separation reasons usually are reasons directly related to a claimant not satisfying Department-mandated eligibility requirements. Other than an increase in job searches (from two to four in 2011) and [the Department-initiated end of winter work search waivers](#), these mandates have been unchanged legally since before 2010. What has changed significantly is how the Department has implemented these requirements. Here is what has been happening since 2013.

WI Proportion of Non-Monetary Non-Separation Denials from 10-2012 to 10-2022



The red (able and available for work), yellow (satisfying job search requirements), and green (other) have gone up and down dramatically over the past ten years.

Since 2016, able and available requirements have led to nearly 30% of all determinations being a denial. This large number of denials is happening because [the Department ignores its own legal requirements for determining able and available](#).


Since 2015, denials because claimants fail to satisfy job search requirements have hovered over 40% and even over 50% except for a rock-like drop at the end of 2021 (discussed below). The job search requirements are leading to all of these denials through a combination of factors, notably the fact that all job

searches must be reported on weekly certifications, and that mandated RESEA training and job registration are on-line only, even though the on-line guidance and assistance for accomplishing these goals are meager at best.

Other denial reasons — a catchall category — was at an over 40% denial rate in 2013, but declined steadily to around 15% by 2017 outside of a significant bump to around 25%/30% when the pandemic started. This denial category has been declining since then, however, and is approaching 10% by the end of 2022.

The impact of these changes can truly be seen when looking at these reasons per initial claim.

Denial Rates for Non-Monetary Non-Separation Denials per Initial Claim from 2010-2022



Both the job search (yellow line) and able and available (red line) plunged when the pandemic started, only to begin steep climbs in 2021. By the end of 2022, able and available reasons were leading to the disqualification of nearly 25% of all initial claims and job search issues were leading to the disqualification of over 45% of initial claims. These two reasons alone account for approximately 65% of all initial claims being denied at the end of 2022.

To understand just what is going on with these numbers, here are Wisconsin’s actual numbers for the second quarters of 2020 (57,466 initial determinations issued) and 2022 (59,564 initial determinations issued).

	Able/Avail		Income		Suit.Work		Jobs		Referral		Other	
	Eli	Den	Eli	Den	Eli	Den	Eli	Den	Eli	Den	Eli	Den
2020	133	9,195	0	5,095	169	59	112	33,623	0	0	282	8,798
2022	2,809	10,339	0	581	119	91	15,129	21,586	0	0	4,777	4,133

Thousands of claims were denied at the start of the pandemic because claimants failed to register themselves at the [jobcenter website](#). See “Missed job center registration” at [Unemployment delays, part 2](#). While Wisconsin waived actual job searches, the state did not waive this registration requirement, and so far too many people had their claims denied for this reason. With this data, we now have a number for those denied for failing to register: *more than 33,000*. Only at the end of 2020 did the Department realize this job registration snafu was its own fault and stopped processing denials for this reason for a short time (until [job searches were re-instated](#)). What happened in mid-2020 was an tidal wave of determinations on this one issue of failed job registration.

By the second quarter of 2022, job search requirements and RESEA training were back in place, so job registration is again just one of many ways a claimant can be disqualified. When they complete these requirements, an initial determination finding them eligible *as of the date the requirement is completed* is issued. Hence, there are thousands of initial determinations now finding claimants eligible after they are originally denied eligibility for a few weeks.

As obvious in this data, a great deal of work and effort by both the Department and claimants is being spent on these requirements because claimants do not understand what is required of them in the first place.

And, as for the able and available disqualifications, in these situations the Department is simply ignoring its own law and applying a disqualification as it understands it — a claimant must be able to work 32 or more hours in a week in order to qualify for unemployment benefits — rather than what the actual requirements pursuant to unemployment law are — a claimant must be able to work as many hours in a week as physically or mentally capable of working, and will be able and available for work even if that number is less than 32 hours in a week. Most claimants in Wisconsin with a disability are being denied eligibility for no legal reason.

Overall, what this data shows is that the vast majority of people in Wisconsin filing unemployment claims today are being denied eligibility, and these denials almost always are based on claimants failing to satisfy Department claim-filing requirements. That is the story of unemployment in Wisconsin.

Advertisements

Occasionally, some of your visitors may see an advertisement here, as well as a [Privacy & Cookies banner](#) at the bottom of the page.

You can hide ads completely by upgrading to one of our paid plans.

[Upgrade now](#) [Dismiss message](#)

Legislature pushes a bunch of no-reform unemployment proposals

vforberger :: 4/11/2023



Updated 12 April 2023 (added links to [various policy briefs from NELP](#) and a quotation from the 2023 fraud report).

With the April 2023 election, an incredibly general, state-wide advisory ballot question about people on welfare needing to work passed by wide margins.

The Wisconsin legislature has taken that passage as a message to suddenly revamp and fine tune unemployment eligibility without actually fixing any of the problems with unemployment claim-filing in this state.

First some background.

It is vital to know that unemployment claim-filing is now in 2023 much, much different from what used to occur.

1	Year	Claimants Paid Benefits	Initial Claims
2	2007	332,982	638,548
3	2008	386,574	736,245
4	2009	566,353	1,125,127
5	2010	530,886	826,872
6	2011	445,538	722,018
7	2012	366,829	613,667
8	2013	312,325	550,050
9	2014	233,129	488,472
10	2015	197,070	423,858
11	2016	168,006	385,405
	2017	144,727	305,813
	2018	130,710	279,912
	2019	129,888	287,043


12	2020	603,459	1,202,700
13	2021	295,249	529,476
14	2022	116,302	263,248
15			
16			
17			

As this data reveals, claim-filing in Wisconsin had plummeted just before the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020. In 2018, there was a record low of initial claims filed by individuals, and in 2019 there was a record low in the number of people who were paid unemployment benefits in Wisconsin.

Compare these numbers with what existed in 2007, a “normal” economic year when initial claims and weekly certifications were around 10 questions each and could be filed via a phone call. In that year, there were 638,548 initial claims, and 332,982 claimants were paid benefits that year (more than one out of every ten workers received unemployment benefits that year).

Obviously, the Covid-19 pandemic reversed that trend. But, that reversal was incredibly short-lived. In 2022, new record lows for claimants paid benefits *and* for initial claims filed in the state were set. Initial claims in 2022 were roughly 89% of the number of initial claims filed in 2019, and paid claimants in 2022 were under 90% of 2019 levels. And, this trend of ever declining unemployment has continued into 2023. As of week 13 of 2023, initial claims are running at around 84% of 2022 levels. So, 2023 is likely going to set still another record low for initial claims and in benefits paid to claimants.

At the same time that unemployment claim-filing has declined and declined and then declined some more, the labor force in Wisconsin has been relatively stagnant and unchanging throughout this time period.



In 2007, there were 2,732,290 workers in Wisconsin, and in 2022 there were 2,754,514 workers, an increase of only 22,224 after 15 years.

So, unemployment has become less and less an issue for Wisconsin workers. The data right now indicates that the vast majority of claims are filed in the winter months, when scores of businesses like landscaping, road building, some construction, and others cannot operate because of winter conditions.

Into this picture of unemployment claim-filing comes the state legislature now with a bunch of sticks to beat over the head of the few people still seeking unemployment benefits. Here is a rundown of these proposals.

AB147

This bill provides new ways to disqualify claimants for misconduct for:

- *any* damage to employers' property *and* records done unintentionally, by accident,
- possible violations of employers' social media policies, and
- violations of employers' absenteeism policies pursuant to [Beres](#).

This expansion of *Beres* and accidental damage raise a serious risk of Wisconsin employers losing their FUTA tax exemption, because the misconduct penalty of lost wages in a benefit year can only be applied to intentional employee conduct.

As noted by the Commission in its briefing in *Beres*, this employer-determined misconduct for non-intentional absences (in both *Beres* and *Stangel*, the employees were absent because of illnesses over which they had no control) ran the risk of Wisconsin being found by the US Department of Labor to no longer be in compliance with federal requirements for unemployment. That lack of compliance could well lead to Wisconsin employers losing a tax credit and seeing their federal unemployment taxes jumping from a 0.5% to 7.0% tax rate — quite a jump.

As to the social media violation, this proposed change is basically incomprehensible. As written, this proposed statute makes any social media violation by an employee into misconduct. Accordingly, any employer discharge for a social media policy can now subject an employee to a misconduct disqualification. Hence, this provision is also likely to put state employers at risk of losing their FUTA tax exemption.

AB147 also mandates that employees with combined wage claims (also called interstate claims) who live outside of Wisconsin must register with the job center in their state. The problems with this proposed change are two-fold. First, the Department already requires claimants to do this registration. Second, this requirement ignores the fact that not all states and territories have job registration systems. Indeed, Minnesota, just next door, has no such requirement or system. As a result, Wisconsin is requiring claimants to do something that cannot actually be done in a state that lacks a job center like Wisconsin's.

AB147 continues with still more nonsense. At present, the Department audits about 10% of all work searches. This proposal wants to increase the number of work searches being audited to 50%. As a result, it would either require the Department to quintuple its workforce or force current employees to do nothing but work search auditing.

Finally, in a pique over the PUA and MEUC benefits and supplemental PUC benefits that were made available during the pandemic, the legislature wants the Joint Committee on Finance to have a voice in whether similar funds and benefits become available in the state in the future. As evident here, [the legislators simply fail to understand that Wisconsin has a partial wage formula that encourages people to work while claiming unemployment benefits](#). Indeed, raising the benefit levels and removing the current \$500 cap would probably lead to more people working while collecting unemployment, not less. Apparently, basic economics is not needed for unemployment legislation.

AB149

- Requires the Department to allow employers to report people who do not show up for interviews, who declines a job interview, who miss an interview, who miss work, or who fail to return to a job after being recalled. The Department, however, already encourages employers to report this information. See, e.g., [Refused Work](#), [Work Available with Current Employer](#), and [Report Unemployment Fraud](#). All of these employee actions would also lead to a loss of benefits, IF the person was claiming benefits at the time.

So, this portion of the bill changes nothing that it purports to do. Claimants who fail to attend a job interview for reasons that do not relate to illness or finding another job are likely to be found ineligible for benefits and perhaps even guilty of [fraud/concealment](#). Indeed, this proposal actually makes claim-filing less onerous by allowing a person to have one such report as NOT counting against their eligibility (when right now, all such reports are investigated and ineligibility found if the claimant lacks the required legal justification).

Furthermore, this proposal ignores the fact that claimants are already doing four job searches a week in an economic climate where employers are desperate for finding employees to hire. Accordingly, employees may well find new jobs and skip interviews or offers to return to jobs after finding new jobs that pay more. And, as shown already, in 2022 and 2023, claim-filing is at record lows. In short, this proposal pretends that the labor supply is growing and that there are numerous unemployed people looking for jobs while claiming unemployment benefits, when the claim-filing data indicates the exact opposite.

- Require the Department to provide various employer information in its fraud reports and job search information to claimants.

This proposal adds: (a) some mandatory employer-reporting information to future [Department Fraud Reports](#) about missed job interviews and the like to the Department, and (b) a requirement to provide claimants with [vital work search information](#) that they now have to search for on their own.

As NELP points out, [work search requirements have become an incredibly effective mechanism for keeping benefits out of claimants' hands](#). Job searches themselves are easy, but the online-only reporting requirements are difficult to satisfy. As the [2023 Fraud Report](#) at 6 reveals:

In 2022, DWD completed 22,012 work search audits. The audits resulted in 9,045 adverse decisions with benefits denied, including when claimants failed to conduct four valid work search actions. An additional 27,404 adverse determinations were issued for failure to answer the work search question or failure to provide required information on the weekly claim before the claim paid.

Nearly 28,000 claimants in 2022 (out of 263,248 initial claims, or one out of every nine claimants) lost out on benefits because they did not supply required job search information in the first place, even before an audit took place. When one out of every nine people fail to finish something, that reporting requirement is, by definition, NOT easy and understandable.

AB150

This bill is [a repeat of the re-employment bill from the previous session](#), and is still misguided, liberal, big government intervention into micro-managing people's work lives.

AB152

This bill appears to be a Department-sponsored initiative and mandates things already being done by the Department or which the Department would like to do.

- Identity verification — mandates identity verification for claimants (currently based on Wisconsin-issued IDs).
- Mandatory [unemployment training for employers](#) that are free to attend and [videos for claimants](#). What should be required here is that the Department again mail out [printed copies of the claimants' handbook](#) rather than just a sheet of paper — [a claim confirmation](#) — with a URL for the handbook on it.
- Expanded call center hours whenever there is a declared state of emergency or call volume has increased by 300% from the previous level of a year ago. At present, numerous claimants are reporting to me that 15-20 phone calls a day are all leading to busy signals, so perhaps an increase of 50% should lead to expanded call center hours.
- Mandatory comparison with death records, new hire reporting, and prison records on a weekly basis. The Department already does this cross-match, though delayed by weeks or months.

What should be required is that DWD be mandated to do cross-matches with the quarterly unemployment tax reports the Department receives from employers in April, July, October, and January of each year for all weekly certifications filed during the previous four months (the Department's current practice is to do a cross match on employer's quarterly unemployment tax reports from nine to twelve months after the weekly certifications have been filed).

The Department should also be mandated to do cross-matches with employer's payroll tax withholding reports submitted to the Department of Revenue on a monthly basis. In this way, any over-payments of unemployment benefits would be minimized to a month or less. Moreover, employers would no longer need to submit [UCB-23 Wage Verification/Eligibility reports](#), as the Department would already have this information from the wage/tax withholding reports from the Department of Revenue.

- Unilateral transfer of administrative law judges from other state agencies to DWD for handling unemployment hearings.

Rather than hiring and training attorneys properly, the Department wants to force attorneys who handle environmental regulation cases, discrimination matters, or workers compensation cases into hearing and deciding unemployment cases. What the Department should be focused on is adequate training and hiring, not another kind of quick fix. As I have pointed out elsewhere, [the skyrocketing number of denials and over-payments is largely because of inadequate information available to claimants](#). So, getting claimants educated with concrete, specific advice in place of legalisms so as to avoid all the denials in the first place is what is needed here.

AB153

This proposal seeks to limit the number of weeks of unemployment benefits available according to the state unemployment rate. An unemployment rate of 3.5% or less would mean only 14 possible weeks of unemployment benefits would be available. Only when the unemployment rate was higher than 9% would the full 26 weeks of benefits be available.

This proposal fundamentally misunderstands how unemployment works and why it exists. Unemployment benefits are not something that workers earn. Rather, unemployment is an insurance benefit for maintaining consumer demand for which employers pay a premium, based on their experience rating. As explicitly stated in [Wis. Stat. § 108.01](#) (emphasis supplied):

(1) Unemployment in Wisconsin is recognized as an urgent public problem, gravely affecting the health, morals and welfare of the people of this state. *The burdens resulting from irregular employment and reduced annual earnings fall directly on the unemployed worker and his or her family. The decreased and irregular purchasing power of wage earners in turn vitally affects the livelihood of farmers, merchants and manufacturers, results in a decreased demand for their products, and thus tends partially to paralyze the economic life of the entire state. In good times and in bad times unemployment is a heavy social cost, directly affecting many thousands of wage earners.* **Each employing unit in Wisconsin should pay at least a part of this social cost, connected with its own irregular operations, by financing benefits for its own unemployed workers. Each employer's contribution rate should vary in accordance with its own unemployment costs, as shown by experience under this chapter. Whether or not a given employing unit can provide steadier work and wages for its own employees, it can reasonably be required to build up a limited reserve for unemployment, out of which benefits shall be paid to its eligible unemployed workers, as a matter of right, based on their respective wages and lengths of service.**

(2) The economic burdens resulting from unemployment should not only be shared more fairly, but should also be decreased and prevented as far as possible. **A sound system of unemployment reserves, contributions and benefits should induce and reward steady operations by each employer, since the employer is in a better position than any other agency to share in and to reduce the social costs of its own irregular employment.** Employers and employees throughout the state should cooperate, in advisory committees under government supervision, to promote and encourage the steadiest possible employment. A more adequate system of free public employment offices should be provided, at the expense of employers, to place workers more efficiently and to shorten the periods between jobs. Education and retraining of workers during their unemployment should be

encouraged. Governmental construction providing emergency relief through work and wages should be stimulated.

(3) A gradual and constructive solution of the unemployment problem along these lines has become an imperative public need.

In other words, unemployment is a lot like automobile insurance. The more accidents you have (i.e., more layoffs and claims), the higher your insurance premium. And, just because a driver may have been “accident-free” for some time does not mean the driver should then cut coverage — especially just before the driver hits a busload of school children on the highway. This proposal is essentially pretending that Wisconsin will forever in the future be “accident-free.”

NELP has some excellent information on [unemployment financing](#) and [why limits on the number of weeks](#) makes no sense and is actually harmful:

Business interests often overlook the vital stabilizing effect UI has on local economies, even though this is also a foundational purpose of the program. UI is an automatic stabilizer: by temporarily replacing some of the lost wages of unemployed workers, it automatically fuels overall economic demand when private spending declines during a national recession or local downturn. Cutting benefit duration reduces this stabilizing function, making layoffs more harmful to the economy.

Advertisements

Occasionally, some of your visitors may see an advertisement here, as well as a [Privacy & Cookies banner](#) at the bottom of the page. You can hide ads completely by upgrading to one of our paid plans.

[Upgrade now](#) [Dismiss message](#)

Replacing unemployment with reemployment

vforberger :: 10/22/2021



[Rep. Petryk](#), [Rep. Penterman](#), and [Sen. Roth](#) have proposed a [major revamp](#) of unemployment support that would re-make the Department of Workforce Development into a government-sponsored job coach that would, presumably, guide claimants to new jobs.

In place of a free labor market, where claimants get to make their own decisions about which jobs to apply to and how to go about searching for work, these politicians want to mandate government involvement and even control of claimants' job search efforts. Here is what they propose.

- The Department **must** provide claimants with four potential job opportunities, one or more of which could be a temporary help company. Claimants who do not apply for work with that temp company are likely to lose their eligibility for unemployment benefits.
- RESEA training will be **mandatory** for all claimants. This requirement is already understood as required by the Department, but this proposal removes any discretion and makes attending a job search training seminar mandatory for all claimants who seem likely to exhaust their eligibility.
- That drug testing for claimants **must** be implemented by the Department. As [previously noted](#), this drug testing would require the Department to provide drug treatment counseling as well for those who test positive or fail to appear for a drug test.
- As of a claimant's second weekly certification, claimants **must** have a resume on the [Job Center of Wisconsin website](#). This requirement already exists for every claimant's benefit year, however, per the job registration requirement. See [Laura Hoffman](#), UI Hearing No.17002961MW (16 Nov. 2017) (claimant must complete job registration requirement within 14 days of initiating a claim for unemployment benefits). So, this proposal is nothing more than shortening the requirement to seven days.

- Starting with the third week claimed, two of a claimant's four job searches **must** be job applications or job interviews.
- When there are three weeks of unemployment benefits left in a claimant's benefit year, the claimant **must** attend a reemployment counseling session with a Department staffer.
- The Department **must** compile reports regarding claimants' job experience for the three years after the claimant first receives unemployment benefits. This part of the proposal is likely to run afoul of federal claimant confidentiality requirements. To the extent that this request reflects general job experience and claimant experience broken down by county or region, there is nothing preventing such a general report from being prepared by the Department right now.

As the sponsors of this proposal explain in [their introductory memo](#) about the changes they propose:

- * Requiring the Department of Workforce Development to engage in universal workforce assessments and reemployment services by providing individuals early access to customized workforce services to get them access to employment services at the start of the UI claim.
 - This means claimants will receive an online career readiness assessment when starting their claim to identify their career skills and talents.
 - DWD will then use this information to develop a personalized employment plan for the individual.
 - Require the claimant to participate in services to help complete their employment plan, like resume writing workshops, soft-skills training, and employment workshops.

Perhaps the most odious change being proposed is to add the following language in a proposed Wis. Stat. § 108.01(2m) as a fundamental goal of unemployment benefits:

The Social Security Act requires that, in order for an individual to be eligible for reemployment assistance benefits, the individual must be able to work, available to work, and actively seeking work. The reemployment assistance program in Wisconsin should enact and focus on policies that complement individuals' efforts to find employment.

There has been a great deal of litigation in other states who ended their PUC and PUA and PEUC benefits prematurely [under the pretense that these programs kept the unemployed from finding jobs](#). Litigation has been lost in some of those states that had a reemployment provision similar to the one being proposed here. Courts found that reemployment, rather than financial support after a job loss, meant that states had to end these programs prematurely. So, this proposal in essence is to make it easier for a state to end future federal emergency benefits under the guise of reemployment.

Note: To reinforce the importance of reemployment over unemployment, the majority of the proposed bill is concerned with changing the name of unemployment to reemployment.

The only helpful change in this proposal is to expand the earnings disregard to \$30 or 40% of a claimant's weekly benefit rate, whichever is greater, for calculating [a claimant's partial benefit](#). For example, a claimant with a weekly benefit rate of \$250 would have an earnings disregard \$100 rather than the current \$30. So, weekly earnings of \$90 would mean the claimant would keep all \$250 in unemployment benefits that week, and weekly earnings of \$400 would mean the claimant would still receive \$49 in unemployment benefits that week. Unfortunately, this proposal keeps the \$500 wage cap in place, so a claimant still loses all eligibility when earnings wages of \$500 or more.

Note: The proposal also includes bonuses to employers for hiring long term unemployed workers. Such efforts are generally considered [ineffectual or even foolish](#).

In short, this proposal seeks to make a government agency into an entity that micro-manages claimants' job search efforts. Free-market Republicans are certainly not behind this proposal. Rather than creating an environment by which claimants could educate themselves and improve their job skills, this proposal is mainly concerned with forcing job searches down the throats of claimants so as to create a pool of labor for temp companies to draw on. Say what you want about the big government plans of Ted Kennedy, but he never sought to turn government into a mechanism for attacking working people when they are down and jobless.

Advertisements

Occasionally, some of your visitors may see an advertisement here, as well as a [Privacy & Cookies banner](#) at the bottom of the page. You can hide ads completely by upgrading to one of our paid plans.

[Upgrade now](#) [Dismiss message](#)

228-ProgramIntegrtyFund

Month-Yr	Beginning	Addition	Disbursement	Total Amount	UI amount (Addition / 25%)*	Notes
Dec 2015	\$1,138,000	\$8,102.47	-\$133.93	\$1,146,000	\$32,409.88	
Jan 2016	\$1,146,000	\$12,091.89	-\$196.34	\$1,158,000	\$48,367.56	
Feb 2016	\$1,158,000	\$26,315.17	\$19,255.37	\$1,165,000	\$105,260.68	
Mar 2016	\$1,165,000	\$75,053.99	-\$366.46	\$1,241,000	\$300,215.96	
Apr 2016	\$1,241,000	\$71,592.92	\$19,067.34	\$1,293,000	\$286,371.68	
May 2016	\$1,293,000	\$72,107.43	-\$435.75	\$1,366,000	\$288,429.72	
Jun 2016	\$1,366,000	\$44,568.49	-\$482.94	\$1,411,000	\$178,273.96	
Jul 2016	\$1,411,000	\$58,088.11	\$18,719.16	\$1,450,000	\$232,352.44	
Aug 2016	\$1,450,000	\$77,247.27	-\$9,391,965.92	\$10,920,000	\$308,989.08	UI ER taxes diversion and excess funds transfer
Sep 2016	\$10,920,000	\$61,369.29	-\$1,637.09	\$10,983,000	\$245,477.16	
Oct 2016	\$10,983,000	\$76,741.69	\$15,144.37	\$11,044,000	\$306,966.76	
Nov 2016	\$11,044,000	\$0.00	-\$4,055.23	\$11,048,000	\$0.00	
Dec 2016	\$11,048,000	\$172,191.84	-\$3,898.74	\$11,224,000	\$688,767.36	
Jan 2017	\$11,224,000	\$77,575.03	\$14,343.46	\$11,288,000	\$310,300.12	
Feb 2017	\$11,288,000	\$90,834.45	\$1,901.42	\$11,377,000	\$363,337.80	
Mar 2017	\$11,377,000	\$193,606.50	\$786.38	\$11,569,000	\$774,426.00	
Apr 2017	\$11,569,000	\$339,318.74	\$7,451,369.14	\$4,457,000	\$1,357,274.96	
May 2017	\$4,457,000	\$1,881,399.37	\$37,557.21	\$6,301,000	\$7,525,597.48	UI ER taxes diversion
Jun 2017	\$6,301,000	\$90,420.80	-\$37,426.39	\$6,429,000	\$361,683.20	
Jul 2017	\$6,429,000	\$88,885.49	\$22,387.47	\$6,495,000	\$355,541.96	
Aug 2017	\$6,495,000	\$779,559.22	\$22,933.02	\$7,252,000	\$3,118,236.88	
Sep 2017	\$7,252,000	\$71,251.19	\$1,826.29	\$7,322,000	\$285,004.76	
Oct 2017	\$7,322,000	\$63,730.83	\$24,815.08	\$7,360,000	\$254,923.32	
Nov 2017	\$7,360,000	\$457,247.50	\$38,712.76	\$7,779,000	\$1,828,990.00	
Dec 2017	\$7,779,000	\$59,147.71	\$290.79	\$7,838,000	\$236,590.84	
Jan 2018	\$7,838,000	\$68,801.77	\$18,341.60	\$7,888,000	\$275,207.08	
Feb 2018	\$7,888,000	\$360,411.57	\$35,397.74	\$8,213,000	\$1,441,646.28	
Mar 2018	\$8,213,000	\$100,052.28	\$58,362.80	\$8,255,000	\$400,209.12	
Apr 2018	\$8,255,000	\$297,457.75	\$89,873.50	\$8,463,000	\$1,189,831.00	
May 2018	\$8,463,000	\$1,924,160.24	\$85,761.41	\$10,301,000	\$7,696,640.96	UI ER taxes diversion
Jun 2018	\$10,301,000	\$86,497.32	\$117,475.00	\$10,270,000	\$345,989.28	
Jul 2018	\$10,270,000	\$72,138.44	\$390.46	\$10,342,000	\$288,553.76	
Aug 2018	\$10,342,000	\$765,657.27	-\$3,066.68	\$11,110,000	\$3,062,629.08	
Sep 2018	\$11,110,000	\$60,928.08	\$1,438.57	\$11,170,000	\$243,712.32	
Oct 2018	\$11,170,000	\$61,942.33	\$30,281.62	\$11,202,000	\$247,769.32	
Nov 2018	\$11,202,000	\$476,085.75	\$31,431.74	\$11,646,000	\$1,904,343.00	
Dec 2018	\$11,646,000	\$63,136.69	\$23,111.90	\$11,686,000	\$252,546.76	
Jan 2019	\$11,686,000	\$72,865.63	\$25,329.45	\$11,734,000	\$291,462.52	
Feb 2019	\$11,734,000	\$378,403.45	\$27,965.97	\$12,084,000	\$1,513,613.80	
Mar 2019	\$12,084,000	\$120,856.14	\$9,543.27	\$12,196,000	\$483,424.56	
Apr 2019	\$12,196,000	\$240,317.36	\$85,821.61	\$12,350,000	\$961,269.44	
May 2019	\$12,350,000	\$1,956,843.90	\$78,370.46	\$14,229,000	\$7,827,375.60	UI ER taxes diversion
Jun 2019	\$14,229,000	\$91,161.51	\$63,222.18	\$14,257,000	\$364,646.04	
Jul 2019	\$14,257,000	\$69,902.97	-\$415,378.61	\$14,742,000	\$279,611.88	
Aug 2019	\$14,742,000	\$769,884.26	\$49,729.12	\$15,462,000	\$3,079,537.04	


228-ProgramIntegrtyFund

Sep 2019	\$15,462,000	\$65,769.37	-\$11,562.17	\$15,539,000	\$263,077.48	
Oct 2019	\$15,539,000	\$67,467.19	\$2,484,532.38	\$13,122,000	\$269,868.76	
Nov 2019	\$13,122,000	\$477,146.91	\$1,833,441.58	\$11,766,000	\$1,908,587.64	
Dec 2019	\$11,766,000	\$57,080.46	\$167,920.98	\$11,655,000	\$228,321.84	
Jan 2020	\$11,655,000	\$77,142.25	\$6,361.06	\$11,726,000	\$308,569.00	
Feb 2020	\$11,726,000	\$351,922.59	\$21,171.49	\$12,057,000	\$1,407,690.36	
Mar 2020	\$12,057,000	\$110,449.96	-\$2,298.37	\$12,169,000	\$441,799.84	
Apr 2020	\$12,169,000	\$240,624.22	-\$2,395.04	\$12,412,000	\$962,496.88	
May 2020	\$12,412,000	\$0.00	\$28,425.62	\$12,384,000	\$0.00	
Jun 2020	\$12,384,000	\$2,046,908.55	-\$413.65	\$14,431,000	\$8,187,634.20	UI ER taxes diversion
Jul 2020	\$14,431,000	\$0.00	\$8,780.44	\$14,422,000	\$0.00	
Aug 2020	\$14,422,000	\$47,319.23	\$30,645.29	\$14,439,000	\$189,276.92	
Sep 2020	\$14,439,000	\$682,105.60	\$6,107.89	\$15,115,000	\$2,728,422.40	
Oct 2020	\$15,115,000	\$34,304.30	\$7,768.37	\$15,142,000	\$137,217.20	
Nov 2020	\$15,142,000	\$387,871.95	\$22,906.33	\$15,507,000	\$1,551,487.80	
Dec 2020	\$15,507,000	\$28,481.96	\$13,766.02	\$15,521,000	\$113,927.84	
Jan 2021	\$15,521,000	\$43,564.29	-\$23,002.86	\$15,588,000	\$174,257.16	
Feb 2021	\$15,588,000	\$335,847.81	\$9,706.80	\$15,914,000	\$1,343,391.24	
Mar 2021	\$15,914,000	\$53,216.21	\$43,112.82	\$15,924,000	\$212,864.84	
Apr 2021	\$15,924,000	\$184,245.37	\$22,149.90	\$16,086,000	\$736,981.48	
May 2021	\$16,086,000	\$1,984,544.85	\$16,507.21	\$18,054,000	\$7,938,179.40	UI ER taxes diversion
Jun 2021	\$18,054,000	\$81,980.18	\$16,022.15	\$18,120,000	\$327,920.72	
Jul 2021	\$18,120,000	\$76,608.51	-\$485,516.01	\$18,682,000	\$306,434.04	
Aug 2021	\$18,682,000	\$777,741.91	\$16,410.44	\$19,444,000	\$3,110,967.64	??
Sep 2021	\$19,444,000	\$65,074.34	\$7,510.78	\$19,501,000	\$260,297.36	
Oct 2021	\$19,501,000	\$57,084.04	\$14,440.65	\$19,544,000	\$228,336.16	
Nov 2021	\$19,544,000	\$468,577.89	\$7,673.39	\$20,005,000	\$1,874,311.56	??
Dec 2021	\$20,005,000	\$48,145.99	\$7,262.74	\$20,046,000	\$192,583.96	
Jan 2022	\$20,046,000	\$47,729.62	\$19,336.10	\$20,074,000	\$190,918.48	
Feb 2022	\$20,074,000	\$0.00	\$23,634.05	\$20,050,000	\$0.00	
Mar 2022	\$20,050,000	\$565,670.64	\$5,165.37	\$20,611,000	\$2,262,682.56	
Apr 2022	\$20,611,000	\$0.00	-\$4,335.22	\$20,615,000	\$0.00	
May 2022	\$20,615,000	\$2,881,608.73	\$14,663.39	\$23,482,000	\$11,526,434.92	UI ER taxes diversion
Jun 2022	\$23,482,000	\$133,341.37	\$20,990.09	\$23,595,000	\$533,365.48	
Jul 2022	\$23,595,000	\$104,229.07	\$9,229.75	\$23,690,000	\$416,916.28	
Aug 2022	\$23,690,000	\$824,539.88	\$2,067.08	\$24,512,000	\$3,298,159.52	
Sep 2022	\$24,512,000	\$120,169.86	-\$42,587.31	\$24,675,000	\$480,679.44	
Oct 2022	\$24,675,000	\$129,596.81	-\$48,801.81	\$24,853,000	\$518,387.24	
Nov 2022	\$24,853,000	\$550,799.77	-\$38,318.21	\$25,442,000	\$2,203,199.08	
Dec 2022	\$25,442,000	\$112,817.37	-\$64,185.12	\$25,619,000	\$451,269.48	
Jan 2023	\$25,619,000	\$194,497.05	-\$81,066.53	\$25,895,000	\$777,988.20	
Feb 2023	\$25,895,000	\$554,198.13	-\$66,708.41	\$26,516,000	\$2,216,792.52	
Mar 2023	\$26,516,000	\$226,479.94	-\$78,630.93	\$26,821,000	\$905,919.76	
Apr 2023						
May 2023						
Jun 2023						
Jul 2023						


Aug 2023
 Sep 2023
 Oct 2023
 Nov 2023
 Dec 2023
 Jan 2024

<https://doa.wi.gov/Pages/StateFinances/ReceiptsandDisbursements.aspx>
 (Monthly Statement of Receipts and Disbursements by Fund)


* UI Amount is the amount of unemployment benefits the 25% administrative penalty is applied against



Number of DWD collection court warrants filed per month



TOTAL BENEFIT OVERPAYMENT RECEIVABLES (for all years as of December)



Source: Monthly Balance Sheet

* * * DETAIL FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY * * *

***** WISCONSIN *****

F Y 2 0 2 2 A L L O C A T I O N

MAYTARGS

March 28, 2022

WORK HOURS 1,806.42

FUNCTION	MPU	WORKLOAD	STAFFYRS	PS/PB	DOLLARS
INITIAL CLAIMS	19.764	218,423	39.8	124,361	4,949,568
WEEKS CLAIMED	1.373	1,377,953	17.5	124,159	2,172,783
NON MONETARY	44.865	167,754	69.4	122,287	8,486,718
APPEALS	186.467	24,495	42.1	108,261	4,557,788
SAVE			0.5	103,218	51,609
CLAIMS ACTIVITY STAFF			169.3	119,424	20,218,466
WAGE RECORDS	0.044	13,339,908	5.4	93,898	507,049
TAX FUNCTIONS	47.73	145,314	64.0	85,543	5,474,752
EMPLOYER ACTIVITY STAFF			69.4	86,193	5,981,801
BENEFIT PMT CONTROL			133.3	91,469	12,192,818
UI PERFORMS		480	98.7	73,610	7,265,307
OPERATING STAFF			470.7	97,001	45,658,392
SUPPORT	9.86%		46.4	127,731	5,926,718
AS&T			35.2	96,869	3,409,789
TOTAL STAFF			552.3	99,574	54,994,899
NON-PERSONAL SERVICES					6,258,021
STOP-LOSS/STOP-GAIN					-1,276,322
TOTAL ALLOCATION (excluding POSTAGE)					59,976,598
POSTAGE					2,077,773
TOTAL ALLOCATION (including POSTAGE)					62,054,371

** Prepared by DOL/ETA/OUI, Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services **

* * * DETAIL FOR INFORMATION PURPOSES ONLY * * *

***** WISCONSIN *****

F Y 2 0 2 3 A L L O C A T I O N

MAYTARGS

August 11, 2022

WORK HOURS 1,762.90

FUNCTION	MPU	WORKLOAD	STAFFYRS	PS/PB	DOLLARS
INITIAL CLAIMS	18.351	179,690	31.2	69,910	2,181,192
WEEKS CLAIMED	1.303	1,318,573	16.2	69,910	1,132,542
NON MONETARY	44.831	140,336	59.5	89,707	5,337,567
APPEALS	132.984	25,872	32.5	164,502	5,346,315
SAVE			0.5	89,287	44,644
CLAIMS ACTIVITY STAFF			139.9	100,374	14,042,260
WAGE RECORDS	0.038	14,006,699	5.0	67,246	336,230
TAX FUNCTIONS	40.624	157,422	60.5	77,005	4,658,803
EMPLOYER ACTIVITY STAFF			65.5	76,260	4,995,033
BENEFIT PMT CONTROL			106.7	98,216	10,479,647
UI PERFORMS		480	52.7	81,992	4,320,978
OPERATING STAFF			364.8	92,757	33,837,918
SUPPORT	10.01%		36.5	89,120	3,252,880
AS&T			67	98,060	6,570,020
TOTAL STAFF			468.3	93,233	43,660,818
NON-PERSONAL SERVICES					15,223,259
STOP-LOSS/STOP-GAIN					4,091,351
TOTAL ALLOCATION (excluding POSTAGE)					62,975,428
POSTAGE					1,944,971
TOTAL ALLOCATION (including POSTAGE)					64,920,399

** Prepared by DOL/ETA/OUI, Division of Fiscal and Actuarial Services **